Why do Queensland Urban Water Entities Resist the Adoption of User Pays Pricing? by Chris  Hunt & Dunstan, Keitha
Why do Queensland Urban Water Entities Resist the Adoption of User Pays Pricing? 
 
Chris Hunt 
and 
Keitha Dunstan 
School of Accounting and Commercial Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
Abstract 
 
This study is motivated by the apparent reluctance of Australian urban water entities to adopt the user 
pays pricing formula despite strong encouragement by Australian Governments to do so.  Elements of 
contingency theory, political cost theory and transaction cost economics are employed in developing 
an empirical model to explain the differences between those Queensland urban water entities which 
have been persuaded to accept Government policy and those which have not.  The Queensland urban 
water entities most resistant to adopting the user pays pricing formula were found to be those which 
faced the greatest potential economic wealth transfers combined with a less certain revenue base. The 
findings highlight the potential strategic uncertainty and political nature of the pricing of water and 
that this policy friction poses for government and regulators attempting to encourage the voluntary 
adoption of more efficient pricing formulas. 
 
Key Words: 
 
Uncertainty; Political costs; Transaction costs; Commercialising public sector; Water, User 
pays pricing policy. 
 
Corresponding Author: Chris Hunt 
     E-mail:chris.hunt@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Why do Queensland Urban Water Entities Resist the Adoption of User Pays Pricing? 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The National and State Governments of Australia have been promoting the adoption 
of a user pricing formula of water by urban water entities for more than a decade (COAG, 
1994; DLGP, 1997).  In Australia, the control and management of Urban Water Entities 
(UWE) is predominantly vested in the public sector.  This predominance of UWE public 
sector control and management prevails internationally (NCC, 1997).  In Australia, the 
promotion of this major commercialisation strategic initiative of user pays pricing adoption by 
UWEs is driven by two fundamental issues, the increasing demand for the scarce resource 
water, and, the improved management of this scarce resource.  Despite the fact that Australia 
is the driest inhabited continent on earth (NWC, 2005) with a continually growing population 
and economy, the existing urban water pricing formulas utilised have traditionally not 
considered the true cost of the supply of those services (NCC, 1997).  Claims of underpricing 
of water in Australia are supported by the academic literature (DNR, 1986; Ng, 1986 and 
1987; Dixon and Norman, 1989, DCILPG, 2000a).  International support for the adoption of 
efficient urban water pricing practices predominates the academic literature (Officer, 1981; 
Bruggink, 1982; Dinar and Subramamanian, 1998;Jones, 1998; Saleth & Dinar, 2000; 
Thanassoulis, 2000; Ballestero, Alarcon, & Garcia-Bernabeu, 2002; Kucera, 2001; Dole and 
Bartlett, 2004). 
Following the Tasman Report (NCC, 1997), the Australian Governments devised a 
two-pronged strategy for promotion of the user pays pricing formula adoption by UWEs 
under the banner of national competition policy (COAG, 1994; NCC, 1997; DLGP & DNR, 
1997).  The largest UWEs were mandated, through legislative change (The Local Government 
Act, 1993), to adopt the user pays’ pricing formula.  The remainder of UWEs were given a 
‘free choice’ to adopt user pays.  The ‘free choice’ group was also offered a staged incentives 
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package to encourage the adoption of user pays pricing.  However, at expiry of the first stage 
of the incentives package on 31 July, 2000, only 36.3 % (DLGP, 2002; NCC, 2001) of 
Queensland urban water entities had adopted user pays.  This study examines the water 
pricing policy adopted by 91 UWEs from the Queensland urban water industry to understand 
why the majority of UWEs have resisted government pressure to adopt user pays pricing. 
Anecdotal explanations for the resistance to adopt user pays water pricing focus on the 
political sensitivity of the pricing of water services.  In Australia, references to water pricing 
political sensitivity were noted in to the mid 1980s (PWD, 1984; DNR, 1988a & 1988b). 
Writers have gone so far as to claim that changes in water pricing policy contributed to the 
downfall of a Victorian state government (Miller, 1999: Dargan and Wilson, 1999).  
Internationally, writers also cite the issues of water supply pricing as highly politically 
sensitive (Reuters, 2001a and 2001b; BBC, 2002; How, 2002; IWRA, 2003; UN, 2003).  
The absence of strong empirical evidence motives us to examine the political 
sensitivity as well as the practical factors that drive the monetary impact of changes in water 
pricing as possible drivers of the policy choice.  At a practical level, the adoption of the 
promoted user pays pricing initiative represents a significant change in strategy choice for 
UWEs.  The user pays formula underlying the strategy shift promotes a planning and 
operating horizon of up to 25 years and includes consideration of the long-term infrastructure 
needs to sustain service supply (DCILPG, 2000a and 2000b).  From an accounting 
management control systems viewpoint this potentially represents a significant and more 
complex change.  The level and complexity of that change would be reflective of the need to 
manage lowering degrees of certainty (increased uncertainty) if only to bridge the information 
gap between what is required to support management decision making and control under the 
existing pricing strategy and that required under user pays (Galbraith, 1973; Khandwallah, 
1977; Miles and Snow, 1978; Chapman, 1997 and 2005).  A further practical consideration is 
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due to the potential loss of grant and soft loan support by user pay adopting UWEs.  The 
degree of potential wealth transfer loss would be expected to contribute to the degree of 
political sensitivity (Posner, 1974) surrounding any price rise due to user pays adoption by a 
UWE.  Additionally, this represents the potential loss of a source of funding for adopting 
UWEs, could impact on UWE planning and management certainty (Chapman, 2005). 
The critical political relationships for the user pays adoption choice are those that exist 
between the local government electorate, the local government council and the UWE 
management, and between these organisations and the consumers of water who makeup the 
local government electorate. The circular nature of these relationships adds to the complexity 
of decision making.  At one level, the electorate are responsible for the appointment of 
councillors who act as their agents in managing the affairs of local government, including the 
appointment and oversight of UWE management.  In turn, it is the council, in concert with 
UWE management who are responsible for ‘selling’, or not, user pays adoption to the 
electorate.  Given that the promoters of the user pays pricing formula argue that it provides for 
more efficient and effective management of water resources and the provisioning of urban 
water services, there would appear to be positive reasons for adoption.  The electorate, as 
primary stakeholders, may be swayed by these notions of more efficient and effective 
management of local resources and services, particularly given the ever-increasing pressures 
being applied to water resources in countries such as Australia.  However, should the existing 
pricing policy be under-pricing water services as indicated by government (NCC, 1997), then 
implementation of the user pays formula may result in an increased price for the provision of 
those services.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
For the electorate, who also are the consumers, any increase in the price of services 
due to user pays adoption has the potential to raise mixed and competing motivations.  These 
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motivations include the positive support for more efficient and effective management of 
resources and services and negative reaction to price increases potentially resulting in an 
electoral backlash for the elected councillors.  The potential for any electoral backlash could 
give rise to UWE strategic uncertainty that cannot be ignored. 
The strategic change required for adoption of user pays and the political sensitivity 
that has historically and anecdotally attached to water pricing in the Australian setting 
promotes adoption of a theoretical framework drawing on multiple theory support.  To this 
end, in terms of examining the potential economic implications that might determine UWE 
choice to adopt, or not adopt user pays, the contingent internal choice considerations would be 
driven by the uncertainty which such change embodies and the associated management 
implications (Galbraith, 1973; Samuelson, 1999; Chenhall, 2005; Langfield-Smith, 2005).  
External considerations for the UWE must include the political cost/sensitivity associated 
with the strategy choice (Posner, 1974, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978 and 1979), an element of 
positive accounting theory when applied at the firm, or UWE level.  Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978 and 1979) provide a link between the elements of these two theoretical approaches 
through identifying transaction costs (Williamson, 1979) as a basis for determining the degree 
of political sensitivity.  Transaction-cost economics (hereinafter referred to as transaction cost 
theory) has also been successfully applied in management accounting control research 
(Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuel, 2003; Spekle, 2001) and does provide a basis for assessing 
the degree of firm uncertainty that might arise from user pays adoption issues that can be 
triangulated/compared with the externally generated levels of political sensitivity that might 
similarly be generated. 
Accordingly the theoretical framework employed in this study is constructed using 
elements of contingency theory, political and transaction cost theories.  The multiple theory 
approach adopted in this study is consistent with Chenhall (2003) recommendations in term of 
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employing multiple theories in contingency-based research.  This study also provides a 
potential basis for overcoming Chenhall’s (2003) observation that management accounting 
research does not have access to the data sets that other accounting and accounting research 
does.  An aim of this study is to examine the usefulness of accounting information in 
explaining and/or building understanding about the choices made by the UWEs concerning 
user pays adoption.  This achieved by using the management accounting information reported 
by the UWEs being examined (DCILPG, 2002) in combination with other secondary data.  A 
secandary motivation for this study is to examine whether or not a multiple theory approach 
to contingency-based studies may provide a means of addressing the Hartmann and Moers 
(1999) issue with poor hypotheses construction.  Hartmann and Moers (1999) are critical of 
contingency-based researchers use of the null hypothesis with very few studies identifying the 
direction of association between independent and dependent variables. 
A search of the literature reveals that there is no generally accepted positive theoretical 
framework for public sector policy review (Ball and Foster, 1982; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990; Mayston, 1993; Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997; Field, Lys, & Vincent, 2001; Gianakis 
and Wang, 2003).  This study attempts to bridge that gap through using elements of positive 
theories to build understanding of the water pricing choices made by urban water entities 
(UWEs).  Elements of contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973; Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 2003; Langfield-Smith, 2005), political cost theory (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978 and 1979) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979 and 1986 - 
hereinafter referred to as transaction cost theory) are employed to construct a theoretical 
framework to examine a pricing decision made by commercialising public sector entities.   
The remainder of this paper takes the following form.  In the next section the available 
pricing formula choices are discussed. This sets the basis for development of the hypotheses 
in section three.  The methodology and data set are then provided in section four, followed by 
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a discussion of the study findings.  The conclusions and discussion of study limitations 
complete this paper. 
2 The Pricing Formula Choices 
The predominant pricing formula employed by UWEs prior to user pays was the 
‘access charging’ formula.  The access charging formula, superficially, does overlap with the 
construct of the user pays formula.  However, an understanding of the development of the 
‘access charging’ formula will assist in explaining this overlap and the differences between 
the two formulae that may give rise to user pays adoption friction and uncertainty – 
transaction costs. 
Historically, the management of water resources and water services has been the 
purview of governments.  Within the different tiers of Australia government (federal, state, 
and local), the management and provisioning of water services is primarily undertaken by 
local government.  Until the 1980s, water services were funded under the general rate levied 
by local government based on land values to landowners (some cities such as Brisbane did 
apply a limited form of metering prior to this time (Tucker, 1989)).  For rating consistency 
and equity purposes, the water rate was calculated on the same basis as the general/land rate.  
Using a form of land value as the basis for rate determination was argued to be equitable in 
the sense that persons who could afford more valuable land had a perceived capacity to pay 
more than those persons who could only afford cheaper land.   
The pressures of population growth combined with drought periods during the 1980s 
led some councils to introduce a two-part water rate/tariff that included an ‘excess water 
charge’ additional to the base rate for water services (Tucker, 1989).  The ‘excess water 
charge’ component of the rate for water services was politically determined in terms of the 
amount of water that could be consumed before the excess water charge could be applied and 
the amount per kilolitre of water to be charged.  This base amount of water is also reflected in 
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developing country water services pricing as a ‘life line limit’ and recognises constraints on 
user capacity to pay and the right to water (WHO, 1990; ADB; 1993; Gleick, 1998; UN, 
2003).  The lack of correlation between these charges for water and the actual cost of current 
and future water services in this current form of water services charge underlies the 
classification of this pricing formula, for the purposes of this study, as an ‘access charge’ for 
water services.  The access charging formula takes the following general form: 
excac xVCFBCR +=          (1) 
 Where:  Access charge revenue. =acR
FBC  = Fixed Base Charge calculated as a politically determined 
percentage of unimproved/improved land value and, in some 
cases, a predefined service consumption allowance (life-line 
limit). 
x = the units of service consumed over and above the predefined 
service consumption allowance. 
=excVC  A politically determined charge per unit of excess water 
services consumption. 
 
 
The above elements of the general form of the access charge formula highlight the degree of 
political influence in determining both the base (fixed charge) and variable charge 
components.  In doing so, it highlights a pricing formula that is unlikely to provide the 
funding necessary to operate and maintain sustainable water services.  Further, the access 
charging formula components, with the possible exception of consumption, do not relate to 
the management control and planning considerations needed in terms of current and future 
infrastructure investment, operations and maintenance. 
Under the existing access charging formula, most capital works undertaken by local 
governments attracted state and federal government grants, subsidies and soft loans.  Whilst 
the external funding assisted in reducing the funding control constraints imposed by the 
access charging formula in respect of future infrastructure investment, it did not avoid the 
community and user uncertainty over UWE management that was reflected in the politically 
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sensitive rate jumps associated with new infrastructure investment (PWD, 1984).  Where 
those state and federal funds did not meet the full cost of the works, the local council would 
need to raise those funds from their rate base.  In the case of water services infrastructure, the 
funding shortfall would be met by the water users by way of a one-off rate increase and the 
rate would then be returned to near its previous level in the following year.  Alternatively, the 
rate could be temporarily increased for a number of years as determined by the local council.  
The result of the charging spikes or rate jumps (PWD, 1984) were identified as being 
politically sensitive for elected council members and added weight to developing a form of 
rating that would assist in smoothing rate increases (Hunt and Staunton, 1990).   
The inclusion of an excess water charge in the rating for water services represented a 
change in attitude toward water services charging.  This change was driven by two factors, 
increasing pressure on water resources and the 'hidden' cost of supply of these services (NCC, 
1997).  The cost of supply issue is particularly reflected in the water pricing literature. The 
water industry financial and accounting focused research, over the past two decades, has 
primarily taken a management/supply focus in terms of examining the costing and pricing of 
services (Officer, 1981; Bruggink 1982; PWD, 1984; Ng, 1986 and 1987; Department of 
Natural Resources, 1988a and  1988b; Dixon & Norman, 1989; ADB 1993; WHO, 1994; 
Ogden, 1995; NCC, 1997; DNR, 1999a & 1999b; Thanassoulis, 2000; Sawkins, 2001, 
DCILPG, 2000a and 2000b).  A fundamental driver of these studies is an observed disconnect 
between the services pricing policy and the cost of the sustainable supply of those services.  
This consideration of sustainable supply includes infrastructure investment, operation and 
management, and water resources management.  These studies raise uncertainty over the 
capacity of existing pricing formula to deliver future sustainable water services given the 
expected increases in the demand for water service and the resource water. 
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Intuitively, fundamental drivers of water services pricing sensitivity would be demand 
side issues.  Demand side issues, particularly as they relate to the political sensitivity/cost of 
water services pricing, have not been researched either normatively or positively.  Whilst 
some studies (Hunt & Staunton, 1990; ADB, 1993; WHO, 1994; Ogden, 1995 and 
Thanassoulis, 2000) incorporated financial accounting and water distribution supply side 
considerations they did not examine demand side, user considerations.  Other studies such as 
those by Shaoul (1997), Walker, Clarke, & Dean (1999, 2000a, and 2000b) and Lee, Eddie, & 
Staunton (2001), focused on utility infrastructure asset valuation and reporting issues.  Whilst 
Ogden (1997) examined stakeholder (customer/consumer) issues in relation to management of 
water service outcomes, he did not directly address all demand side issues that could give rise 
to pricing policy implementation friction and uncertainty for owners/users.  Supply 
considerations still dominate the underlying construct of the Queensland user pays formula 
which, in accordance with the Evaluation of Introducing and Improving Two-Part Water 
Tariffs for Local Governments in Queensland: Simplified Guidelines (DCILGPS, 2000a) 
takes the following general form: 
rxVCFCRup ++=          (2) 
 Where: =upR  User pays revenue. 
FC   = Fixed direct and indirect overhead costs for the supply of water 
services that are insensitive to the levels of supply (DCILGPS, 2000a: 
13). 
  x      = Number of units of service consumed. 
  VC   = Direct and indirect variable costs per unit of service supplied. 
  r     = real rate of return (RROR) on infrastructure investment.  
 
Given that the user pays formula promotes a long-run marginal cost approach, the variable 
cost (VC) per unit of service component is: 
         (3) rraaosoamVC ++=
 Where: oam = per service unit contribution toward operations and 
 maintenance costs less depreciation, interest and other 
financing/non-cash charges (DCILGPS, 2000a: 13). 
   os    = per service unit contribution to operations support. 
    per service unit contribution to planned future asset renewal, =rraa
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replacement and/or augmentation (10 – 25 yrs planning 
horizon, 20 – 25 year horizon recommended DCILGPS, 2000a: 
9 & 15). 
  
The access charge formula is a politically determined formula with little relationship to water 
services supply and pricing issues whereas the user pays formula is designed to directly 
consider water service supply issues in determining the price of water services.  The user pays 
pricing formula explicitly incorporates the management control considerations of: current 
infrastructure investment, operations and maintenance costs that are fixed (FC); current 
consumption of services (x); the variable costs associated with the consumption of those 
service and future sustainability costs of the services (VC); and, a real rate of return required 
from the investment (r) that also acts to cap the price of those services.  The user pays formula 
attempts to drive a clear connection between the price of services and the management 
controls necessary to sustain the delivery of water services through their explicit statement 
and consideration in the pricing formula.   
In addressing the issue of under-pricing (NCC, 1997), the potential also exists to not 
only address the sustainability of the required water services (Ng, 1986 and 1987; Dixon and 
Norman, 1989), but also provide a formal incentive for UWE management control systems  to 
monitor and report on the strategies necessary for sustainable delivery of water services.  A 
management control system focus more likely to exist only in larger and/or better resourced 
UWEs under the access charging arrangements. 
 
The user pays pricing formula there provides the perceived potential for improved 
certainty over the future sustainability of the supply of water services.  However, while the 
user pays formula, through RROR and service input considerations, attempts to place an 
upper pricing limit to minimise the charging of monopoly rents (Williamson, 1979; NCC, 
 11
1997; DCILGPS, 2000a; Johnstone, 2003), market demand considerations do not extend to 
issues such as capacity to pay (Posner, 1974; Hunt, 2000) and any uncertainty that that may 
generate for some UWEs.   
A number of obvious differences exist between the access charge formula and the user 
pays formula.  These differences are superficially reflected in the more complex structure of 
the user pays formula and the requirement for a planning horizon of up to 25 years.  These 
planning costs are symptomatic of the higher governance costs associated with idiosyncratic 
investments (Williamson, 1979).  The user pays formula includes in the variable cost 
component the consideration of future infrastructure/capital investments ( ).  A 
fundamental issue not taken up in the user pays adoption policy is the removal of state and 
federal government capital grants, subsidies and soft loans for such infrastructure investment.  
Under funding arrangements existing prior to the adoption of the user pays pricing formula, 
councils could apply to state and federal government for grants and soft loans to fund 
infrastructure investment – systems renewal, replacement and/or augmentation.  The user pays 
formula requires the inclusion of future investment costs in the determination of the current 
price for services.  This represents a regulatory driven change in the relationship between 
water entities and federal and state governments.   
rraa
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1990), such an economic wealth 
transfer (the removal of opportunities for grants and soft loans) has the potential to negatively 
impact on managements’ utility.  This issue has the potential to be significant, in that, the 
degree of economic wealth transfer will need to be off-set by the users of the water services.  
For the UWE this represents a strategic complexity that is not considered under the existing 
access charging pricing formula.  The level of complexity would be reflected through changes 
in political sensitivity and mirrored by changes management uncertainty.  The degree, or level 
of change in complexity, political sensitivity and management uncertainty would be expected 
 12
to be positively correlated to the level of transactions cost associated with the economic 
wealth transfer.  The potential significance of this issue is signalled by the actions of the 
Queensland Local Government Association, the body responsible for urban water 
management, which sought and received confirmation from the State premier that there would 
be no negative financial implications for its membership from any of the national competition 
policy initiatives (Goss, 1995). 
Given the potential for an increase in the price of services should user pays be adopted 
by a UWE, when combined with a potential economic wealth transfer, a convergence of 
management and electoral self-interest could be expected.  An additional source of increased 
UWE user pays adoption uncertainty is raised because user pays adoption results in the loss of 
grant funding, soft loans and other subsidies relating to capital works that has the potential to 
create inequities in the treatment of UWEs.  Should one UWE having exactly the same 
characteristics as another enjoy the benefits of capital works subsidies immediately prior to 
user pays adoption and the other be required to undertake new capital works shortly after user 
pays adoption, the latter would be required to self-fund those capital works.  The result would 
be significantly different pricing for services between these two UWEs post user pays 
adoption with no certainty of any external funding off-set to remedy any such inequity. 
 
3 Hypotheses and Empirical Model Development 
For the purpose of hypothesis development there are two sources of factors likely to 
impact on considerations of the adoption of user pays pricing.  First, consideration needs to be 
given to identifying factors that would directly impact on electoral decision-making and 
associated political costs.  Second, the factors within the user pays formula that have the 
potential to increase prices need to be identified.  The existing political cost/sensitivity 
literature will be used to identify the potential electoral factors.  Identification of pricing 
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formula driven uncertainty and associated transaction costs that have the potential to generate 
political costs will be identified through comparing the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ under the access 
charging model with the potential ‘winner’ and ‘losers’ under user pays. 
Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor (2000: 45) identify numerous factors considered to be 
associated with political sensitivity, size, nature of the industry, potential voters, geographical 
location, marginal versus safe electorate and impending elections.  Given that all UWEs are 
natural monopolies operating in a strategically important industry under already significant 
and uniform reporting requirements, a number of these factors will be constant across the 
study data set.  Factors such as strategic advantage, industry, capital intensity, and social 
responsibility disclosure are taken as being constant as they similarly apply to all data set 
entities.  For the purpose of this study, three measures of political cost/sensitivity will be 
considered: users per service connection; tyranny of distance; and, electoral marginality.  
These three measures will be considered in conjunction with the factors identified in terms of 
‘winners and losers’ resulting from user pays adoption by a UWE.   
A potential measure for political sensitivity is identified by Sydney Water where they 
state that future price increases will impact more on service connections having a greater 
number of users (Davies, 2004).  This is consistent with the use by engineers of household 
numbers in predicting future water services demand levels for the purpose of future 
infrastructure planning and design (Hunt, 2000). Given that the user pays pricing 
determination adopts up to a 25 year planning horizon, population density estimates forms a 
significant estimation component for determining future service demand.  The service demand 
estimate impacts directly on infrastructure investment planning and revenue planning and 
pricing (Hunt, 2000).  Intuitively, higher population density would be associated with more 
users per service connection than lower population density would be.  Should the adoption of 
user pays pricing be associated with a price increase then, the more users per service 
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connection the higher any resultant electoral backlash – political costs.  Additionally, higher 
population density associated with any level of growth would increase planning and control 
uncertainty for management.  In these terms, the hypothesised user pays decision determinant 
effect of political sensitivity is expressed as follows: 
H1: The relative demand per service connection is negatively related to the user pays 
choice. 
 
In the context of this study management self interest is convergent with electorate self 
interest and the avoidance of any electoral backlash due to the adoption of the user pays 
pricing formula.  The proxy that is used for the measure of relative demand per service 
connection is a ratio of the population density of the area serviced by the UWE to the number 
of connections provided by the UWE (POPCON).  The sources of measures for this proxy are 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2003) and the Department of Local Government and 
Planning key comparative data (DLGP, 2002) respectively.   
Tyranny of distance/geographical location as identified by Posner (1974), Tucker 
(1985) and Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor (2000) implies that the further an entity is from the 
centre of political power and control the more sensitive those entities are likely to be toward 
the adoption of policies and regulation generated by that political centre.  Given that the user 
pays model has been centrally developed then the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: Urban water entity distance from the State capital is negatively related to user pays 
choice. 
 
The intuition underlying this hypothesis is that whilst a UWE might benefit from the 
adoption of user pays, the UWE management may choose to not adopt user pays due to 
electorate scepticism and the associated potential political costs attached to past experiences 
with the implementation of centrally developed policies.  An implicit and/or explicit issue is 
the potential loss of planning control that the adoption of an externally developed strategy 
poses for UWE management.  Accompanying any externally motivated strategic initiative is 
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some degree of uncertainty.  However, a potential confounding issue may arise whereby 
management perceive the user pays policy to be a more efficient and effective strategy for 
managing scarce water resources.  In areas where water is scarce, the user pays mechanism 
could be perceived as a supplement to water restrictions in improving security and 
sustainability of supply.  This variable (TYRDST) will be operationalised by dividing the data 
set into three regions, a region that includes the state capital, an adjoining region and one 
other region outside of these two regions using Bureau of Meteorology weather regions 
(BOM, 2004).  This approach provides a basis for aligning UWE climatic and geographic 
similarities. 
Electoral marginality was identified from the political costs literature and has the 
potential to act as a confounding variable.  A perceived potential for the existence of free 
riders through the influence of the power of electoral marginality may exist within the study 
operating setting.  Electoral marginality was identified by Gaunt (1999) as being politically 
sensitive in terms of politicians targeting grant funding toward marginal electorates either to 
maintain the electorate or influence the electorate voting behaviour in their favour.  It is 
argued here that urban water entities operating in marginal electorates will adopt the user pays 
model and take the associated incentives.  This argument is based on the proposition that such 
entities know that they can exert the political sensitivity necessary to maintain the capital 
grant funding advantages of the existing access charging model.  These urban water entities 
operating in marginal electorates are argued to be similar to the ‘free riders’ and accordingly 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: Electoral marginality is negatively related to user pays choice. 
 
   The electoral marginality variable (ELECTM) will be operationalised using 
Gaunt’s (1999) four categories of electoral marginality.  Gaunt identified those levels as being 
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very marginal; marginal, safe, and very safe.  Using state electoral two party preferred results, 
the winning difference between the winner and the runner-up can be determined and that 
margin can then be categorised according to Gaunt’s categorisation rankings.  The data to 
operationalise this hypothesis is drawn from the QLD 2000 state election results (ECQ, 2001). 
However, this measure has the potential to measure only one aspect of political costs – 
the electoral costs.  The factors that have the potential to drive those electoral costs through 
their impact on transaction costs also need to be considered.  These factors, in the context of 
this study, are more likely to emanate from within the user pays pricing formula.   
In order to identify factors that have the potential to drive transaction costs, a 
comparison of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is made between the access charging formula and the 
user pays formula.  This approach is considered to be consistent with the findings of Ball and 
Foster (1982), Panchapakesan and McKinnon (1993), and Whittred, Zimmer and Taylor 
(2000) who claim that size is not the sole determinant of political costs. 
Under the access charging formula the ‘winners’ were those users who have low land 
valuations and were high water service users.  The ‘losers’ under this pricing regime are those 
users owning high value land and who consume less than the free service limit.  However, the 
‘losers’ under the access charging regime are potentially the winners under user pays pricing 
formula.  The caveat of ‘potential winners’ is due to the implications of any economic wealth 
transfer associated with user pays adoption.  Whilst infrastructure investment attracts 
significant subsidy under the existing access charging pricing formula, it is required to be 
funded directly by the users under the user pays pricing formula.  Under these circumstances, 
the age of the existing infrastructure, future service growth potential, and the capacity of users 
to pay do have the potential to affect the pricing of services and increase transaction costs. 
The older the existing infrastructure the sooner there will be the need to include the 
cost of replacement, renewal and/or augmentation of the supply infrastructure in the current 
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price of services.  However, whilst the age of current infrastructure assets is a potential driver 
of transaction costs, should an entity undertake a subsidised capital works immediately 
preceding the decision to adopt the user pays formula, this works investment could act to 
negate any immediate asset age implications particularly in the case of the works being 
completed post user pays adoption.  Further, given that water services infrastructure has up to 
a 140 year life, newer infrastructure would also mean more recent planning and control 
information and more UWE certainty about potential user pays pricing implications.  Under 
these circumstances, two hypotheses designed to capture any potential economic wealth 
transfer effects of user pays adoption will be tested.  In the absence of specific asset age data, 
a readily available performance indicator that can be related to current asset age is annual 
operations and maintenance costs.  Intuitively, as an asset ages, the level of operations and 
maintenance (OAM) costs for that asset will increase.  However, in order to control for 
‘supply size’ (infrastructure investment level) differences between UWEs, and maintain focus 
on demand sensitivity the OAM costs need to be expressed in per service connection terms 
(i.e., measured on an OAM per service connection basis).  Accordingly, H4 is expressed as 
follows: 
H4: Operations and maintenance costs per connection is negatively related to the user 
pays choice.   
 
The negative relationship predicted in H4 is consistent with the notion that it will not 
be in either the UWE management’s self interest or the electorate’s self interest to support an 
economic wealth transfer away from themselves through adoption of the user pays pricing 
formula.  The higher the OAM costs the more immediate would the impact of that transfer be 
felt.  As stated above, the OAM variable will be operationalised in the ratio form of 
operations and maintenance costs per property serviced (OAMPPS).   The source of this data 
is DLGP (2002).  Given that water systems infrastructure can have up to a 140-year 
 18
productive life, high current levels of capital expenditure will reduce the future investment 
cost considerations within the user pays pricing formula (arra).  With these considerations in 
mind H5 is stated as follows: 
H5: The capital expenditure ratio is positively related to the user pays choice. 
 
As stated above, the intuition being tested in H5 is that UWEs incurring high levels of 
capital expenditure prior to the decision to adopt user pays being made are more likely to 
adopt user pays.  To control for size implications across the data set, the variable will be 
operationalised in the form of a ratio of current capital expenditure in terms of current 
infrastructure investment (CAPEXR).  The source of this data is DLGP (2002). 
In terms of the issue of winners and losers, there are two additional pricing decision 
determinant considerations that have the potential to impact on transaction costs, user 
‘capacity to pay’ and ‘service growth trends’.  From a UWE management control perspective, 
the combined effects of capacity to pay and service growth trends have planning implications.  
Lower levels of user capacity to pay combined with a changing user base such as that which 
might be experience in regional and rural areas will have the potential to effect both planning 
and control.  In terms of planning, lower user capacity to pay combined with varying user 
numbers may not only impact on UWE capacity to support existing infrastructure (planning 
and operational efficiency uncertainty – Galbraith, 1973; Amigoni, 1978; Samuelson, 1999) 
but also to consider arrangements with outside providers (loss of control and increased 
uncertainty – Donaldson, 2001).  Further, capacity to pay, given that users are voters, has the 
potential to generate political/transaction costs (Posner, 1974; Williamson, 1979).  Any price 
increase due to the adoption of user pays by a UWE will potentially have higher electoral 
backlash for those UWEs servicing higher levels of users with a diminished capacity to pay.  
Any transaction costs associated with a user base experiencing a diminished capacity to pay 
would be compounded by large average household numbers.  This issue should be addressed 
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in the testing of H1 when testing demand sensitivity but does raise a potential issue for 
multicollinearity that will be considered in the results analysis phase of this study.  In relation 
to capacity to pay and user pays adoption, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
H6: Capacity to pay is negatively related to user pays choice. 
 
The intuition underlying this hypothesis is that it will not be in the interest of the 
management of those UWEs servicing users who predominantly have low capacity to pay due 
to the potential electoral costs associated with any higher prices for service that might occur 
with the adoption of user pays.  In this study, wherever possible management and financial 
accounting data is used.  As previously stated, an aim of this study was to examine the 
relevance of accounting measures in extending public sector research.  This approach is 
argued to be supported by the management accounting performance measurement research 
literature (Brownell, 1987; Brownell and Hirst, 1986).  Accordingly, the measure used is the 
ratio of revenue arrears to total water services revenues (ARREAREV).  The source of this 
data is DLGP (2002). 
Service growth trend has potential implications for mitigating the size measure of 
demand sensitivity and the future impact of any economic wealth transfer but it is potentially 
a ‘double edged sword’.  For those UWEs experiencing positive user growth (a positive 
revenue base growth), a capacity to defray any increase in price under user pays across a 
growing connections base could exist.  Having the capacity to defray costs would allow those 
costs to be ‘spread thinner’, providing the potential for the price effects of those cost increases 
to be mitigated.  However, should the UWE be experiencing a static or declining revenue base 
then any user pays price increase effects have the potential to be more noticeable.  In the case 
of UWEs experiencing negative revenue base growth, over time, any price increase effects 
due to user pays adoption will become increasingly more noticeable due to increasingly fewer 
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users being required to bear the price increase burden.  Service growth trend is expected to be 
a significant choice determinant also from a strategic adoption perspective.  The user pays 
strategy requires consideration of all firm relationships and associated activities necessary to 
provide the sustainable delivery of water services.  That is, the user pays strategy is the price 
determination enabling strategy for an adopting UWE.  The success of any pricing strategy is 
contingent upon the consumption, or usage of the services that it prices.  For UWEs the 
community it serves is its user base.  Due to the natural monopoly operational setting 
constraints for UWEs, if the community base is declining then their revenue base is declining 
but they do not have the physical capacity to access other markets.  In terms of service growth 
trend the following hypothesis will be tested. 
H7: Service growth trend is positively related to user pays choice. 
As it is the growth trend that is of interest, this variable (ANGRO) will be 
operationalised identifying only the category of service growth trend being experienced by a 
UWE: positive growth; static growth; or negative growth.  The source of data for this measure 
is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2003).  
The empirical model is summarised in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
4 Methodology and Data Set 
Given that it is the choice between two competing pricing formula that is being 
examined, a dichotomous dependent variable is used (‘0’ for choosing not to adopt user pays, 
and ‘1’ for choosing to adopt user pays).  When combined with a sample size of 91 cases, and 
the inclusion of both continuous and categorical independent variable measures, the binary 
logistic regression technique was selected to facilitate model analysis (Garson, 2004; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Howell, 1997; Hair, Anderson, & Black, 1998).  The study 
model is expressed in the following more formal binary logistic terms: 
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Yppc = A +β1POPCON + β2TYRDST + β3ELECTM + β4OAMPPS + β5CAPEXR +β6ARREAREV + 
β7ANGRO +ε       (4) 
  
Where: 
Yppc   is the DV Pricing Policy Choice and takes a dichotomous form (0) for 
non-adoption of user pays and (1) for the adoption of user pays; 
  A is a constant; 
β is the respective explanatory/predictor coefficient for each of the 
proxies identified prior to formalisation of the study model; and 
 ε   is the error term. 
In 2000, the Queensland Local Government was responsible for managing $27.9 
billion of the $142.4 billion of net assets managed by Australian Local Government, receiving 
$4.4 billion of the $27.9 billion revenues generated by that net asset investment (DoTaRS, 
2001).  In 1995-96, water assets represented approximately $50 billion of total Local 
Government net assets in Australia (NCC, 1997).  The water industry and local government in 
Australia and QLD have a significant economic impact. 
The Queensland water industry is representative of the Australian urban water industry 
and the developed country non-privatised world water industry.  Queensland water industry 
entities operate in a range of climatic conditions that include temperate, sub-tropical, tropical, 
semi-arid and arid covering some 1,734,560 square kilometers (approximately 23% of the 
Australian land area and 7 times the UK land area).  These entities access ground and/or 
surface water sources in the supply of water services over a wide range of geographical 
conditions. The Queensland water industry has 125 UWEs.  Reforms to implement user pays 
in Queensland were initiated in 1997 for the largest 17 (now 18) of the 125 local government 
authorities in Queensland through legislative amendments to The Local Government Act, 
1993 (DCILGPS (2000a: i).  Smaller councils were eligible for funding support to review the 
cost effectiveness of implementing user pays until the end of December 2000 (DCILGPS 
(2000a: i).  This 2000 cut-off provides the basis for selecting the timing of study data as it 
also represented the original designated end of incentives for the adoption of user pays.  The 
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combination of all of these factors is argued to provide a diverse study population having 
greater potential for study finding's applicability to the wider urban water industry and the 
sample size more than meets the requirements of a minimum of 10 cases per variable (Garson, 
2004). 
The descriptive statistics relating to the study model independent variables are 
provided in Table 1 below.  The descriptive statistics are divided in to two panels with Panel 
A providing information concerning model independent variables measured using continuous 
(scale) data and Panel B relating to categorical (nominal and ordinal) independent variables.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Column 2 of Table 1, Panel A identifies the number ‘n’ of sample data cases used in 
providing the descriptive data.  The sample number ‘n’ is influenced by missing cell data for 
individual cases.  The maximum number of cases available for study in QLD was 107, 
however, due to missing cell data this resulted in only 91 cases being suitable for binary 
logistic regression modelling.  As is indicated in Table 1 Panels A and B, the number of cases 
for each independent variable ranges between 107 and 94.  The ‘n’ disparity between 94 and 
91 cases is a result of missing data elements between cases and varying between independent 
variables within cases.  Study sample size is summarised as follows: 
 
 Total QLD Urban Water Entities with adoption choice  107 
 Entities missing data for at least one independent variable    13
            94 
 Entities missing data for at least two independent variable      3 
 Study sample size          91
In terms of the Panel A continuous variables, in all cases the data are skewed to the 
left but do reflect a wide range of cases in terms of political sensitivity (POPCON), asset age 
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(OAMPPS and CAPEXR) and capacity to pay (ARREAREV) issues.  However, in Panel B 
the categorical independent variable data spreads are mixed.  The growth data are relatively 
evenly split between positive growth (48.6%) and negative growth (45.8%).  Tyranny of 
distance measures are biased toward entities away from the state capital and South East 
Queensland (49.5% bordering the South East and 41.1% in remote and North Queensland).  
Historically, in QLD, a majority of the population has resided outside of the Capital.  In the 
case of electoral marginality, approximately 53.3% (rounding) of electorates are identified as 
being safe (categories 0 and 1) with 46.7% of electorates identified as being marginal 
(categories 2 and 3).  No interpretation of this electoral mix is made here.  However, there is a 
significant number of marginal seats and this marginal/non-marginal electoral split is worthy 
of future observation.  Such a large number of marginal electorates could act to reduce 
marginal electoral power due to these seats no longer being a minority of occurrences and the 
additional competition for scarce resources that this proportion of electoral influence 
represents. 
The descriptive statistics confirm that the data set size meets the need for at least 10 
cases per variable with an ‘n’ of 91.  Driving the choice of an appropriate statistical technique 
is the dichotomous structure of the dependent variable, choice of either the access charging 
formula or the user pays formula.  To this end Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), Howell (1997) 
and Hair et al (1998) identify three potential techniques.  These techniques include 
Discriminant Analysis, Multiple Regression and Logistic Regression. However, all indicate a 
strong preference for logistic regression for data samples of around 100 or less cases.  Further 
the bi-modal nature of the data is prone to a non-linear plot taking the form of a sigmoidal 
cumulative probability plot.  The logistic regression is designed to map a sigmoid shaped plot 
(Howell, 1997: 548 - 551). Further, the logistic regression provides a basis for statistically 
assessing the model explanatory/predictive capacity in terms of both the adoption and non-
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adoption outcomes (Garson, 2004; Malle, 2004) thus providing a potential to assess multiple 
motivation issues.  For these reasons the logistic regression technique will be used in this 
study. 
 
5 Results 
Table 2 provides an overview of the model results and the impact of the step-by-step 
omission of non-significant independent variables on the model R square and its statistical 
significance.  Result 1 reports the testing of the full model and results in an R square of 29.2% 
that is statistical significant at α = .05.  The full model predicted 89.1% of those entities 
choosing not to adopt the user pays pricing formula.  Additionally, the full model predicted 
68.6% of those UWEs choosing to adopt user pays.  The overall model predictive capacity is 
81.1%.  However, whilst these results were encouraging, both the logistic regression 
correlation matrix and the Pearson Bivariate correlation matrix indicated the existence of 
multicollinearity driven by the measures relating to electoral marginality and tyranny of 
distance.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Result 4 represents the most parsimonious version of the model achieving an R square 
of 26.4% that is statistical significant at α = .01.  Whilst this represents a marginal decrease in 
the R square achieved in Result 1 and a corresponding marginal reduction in the model 
predictive capacity 89.1% to 85.5% for those entities choosing not to adopt user pays and 
68.6% to 60.0% for those entities choosing to adopt user pays, and an overall model 
predictive capacity change from 81.1% to 75.6%, the level of model statistical significance 
increased from α = .05 to α = .01.  Additionally, the results of both forms of correlation matrix 
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used to analyse multicollinearity issues for Result 1 indicated no evidence of Multicollinearity 
for Result 4. 
Result 4 has further importance in terms of the study findings as this version of the 
study model relies significantly on measures using management accounting information.  
Driving Result 4 is the statistical significance of the measure of current asset age using 
operations and maintenance information (OAMPPS: p = .025 at α = .05) and negative annual 
growth (ANGRO1: p = .026 at α = .05).  These results suggest support for the pre-stated 
expectation of the impact of wealth transfer (OAMPPS) and declining revenue bases 
(ANGRO1) on UWE choice from both internal contingency and external political sensitivity 
perspectives.  Of interest was the performance of the measure for political sensitivity 
(POPCON).  Whilst political sensitivity was not found to be statistically significant, omission 
of the variable measuring political visibility reduced the model R square to 16.2% at α = .05.  
In doing so, the model’s capacity to predict those entities choosing not to adopt user pays was 
reduce below the level of a guess to 41.7%. 
 
6 Conclusion and Limitations 
Our findings highlight the contingent and political nature of the pricing of water and 
the challenges faced by government and regulators in attempts to encourage the voluntary 
adoption of more efficient pricing formulas.  A disappointment was the non-significance of 
the three political sensitivity variables relating user density, tyranny of distance and electoral 
marginality.  Whilst user density, when removed from the model, did impact on the R square 
measure (26.4% down to 16.2%), multicollinerarity led to the exclusion of the tyranny of 
distance and electoral marginality variables.  A potential explanation for the non-significance 
of user density is that the pricing implications of an economic wealth transfer and a declining 
revenue base also absorb some of the political sensitivity.  Given that the strategic shift is 
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pricing policy focused and driven, pricing sensitivity does have the potential to overlap with 
political sensitivity.  Future research might explore ways in which variable selection might 
test this potential sensitivity overlap.   
A potential explanatory of the multicollinearity between tyranny of distance and 
electoral marginality might be explained by a significant number of marginal seats existing in 
regional areas.  This issue is potentially Queensland specific given its history of the majority 
of the population residing outside of the city urban areas and should preclude consideration of 
these variables from future studies of this type.  Management of UWE’s with older assets and 
with lower service growth were less likely to adopt a user pays pricing formula. For these 
UWEs the adoption of a user pays water pricing formula would result in higher charges to 
customers who would be expected to pay sufficient prices to enable to replacement of 
infrastructure assets.  
The adoption of user pays represents a significant strategic initiative change for UWEs 
which has the potential to reduce management certainty (increase uncertainty).  The 
transaction costs associated with the potential for wealth transfer away from UWEs, in 
combination with a declining revenue/customer base, through adoption of the user pays 
strategy are argued to be symptomatic and drivers of this uncertainty.  In the absence of users 
paying for infrastructure, political pressure would be expected to result in grant funding or 
soft loans from state and federal governments to cover these costs.  These results are 
consistent with the conclusion that management of the majority of UWEs have chosen to not 
adopt the user pays formula to avoid the loss of grant funding and soft loans as well as other 
economic wealth transfer implications and/or accept the uncertainty associated with a 
declining revenue base under such policy change. 
These findings have implications for Governments and regulators that are trying to 
encourage user pays adoption by UWEs. One possible solution would be a phased removal of 
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grant and soft loan funding.  This approach would also have the benefit of avoiding any 
inequities between entities receiving such funding in the period leading up to user pays 
adoption and those who would be due to receive these subsidies had user pays not been 
introduced.   
For those entities experiencing declining demand and revenue growth, other strategies 
need to be considered.  These strategies could include the supplementation of the existing 
supply services with customer based tank storage and grey water treatment facilities.  
Alternatively, where practicable, the amalgamation of UWEs and/or the sourcing of bulk 
water delivery support may provide a basis for sustaining service provision to the UWEs 
significantly affected by declining customer bases and water resource constraints.  The issue 
of government funded decentralisation initiatives is not considered here.   
The findings with respect to predicting those entities adopting the user pays formula 
are not as strong as for those entities choosing not to adopt the user pays formula.  However, 
some insight may be provided through a comparative of the attributes UWEs choosing not to 
adopt user pays and those UWEs choosing to adopt user pays.  Exante, this approach may 
provide a basis for overcoming the electoral marginality statistical non-significance in 
explaining any potential for ‘free riders’ and/or any tyranny of distance issues.  At one level 
this should highlight to government and regulators that the progress of adopting entities 
should be monitored in terms of their capacity to sustain service delivery under user pays.   
At another level it does raise an issue concerning the intuition underlying the construct 
of the model and also the issue of poorly specified or omitted variables.  The contingent and 
self interest focus of the theoretical framework does not capture considerations of efficiency 
as a reason for user pays adoption.  Further, the scope limitations of the study have limited 
uncertainty driven contingency considerations, through the medium of transaction cost 
considerations, to a triangulation role in assessing the alignment of UWE internally focused 
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considerations with community and user based externally driven considerations.  However, 
contingency considerations have led to identifying potential infrastructure efficiency issues 
that might arise where a UWE is experiencing combined low user capacity to pay and 
changing user levels.  Further, those UWEs that operate in the water constrained regions may 
be prone to adopt user pays to improve the efficiency of water resources management and the 
delivery of water services even though there are potentially high political costs considerations.  
Under these circumstances, the need for water services may act to override any cost of supply 
issues potentially arising out of user pays adoption. 
Whilst not convincing, the study findings would appear to support Chenhall’s (2003) 
observations of the need to employ support from other theoretical frameworks when 
conducting contingency-based research.  Further, it is felt that this approach has assisted in 
providing a basis for exploring ways of addressing the Hartmann and Moers (1999) 
hypotheses construction issue in contingency-based research.  The use of such theoretical 
support as is potentially provided by transaction cost theory in being able to qualify and/or 
quantify either the degrees of uncertainty or political sensitivity would appear to provide some 
means of testing the direction of association.  In doing so, providing a basis for strengthening 
hypothesis statement. 
Further study limitations arise directly from the nature of the data set examined.  The 
data set, whilst it may be argued to be representative of the Australian water industry, limits 
further generalisation of the findings.  The Queensland water industry operates in a developed 
country setting thus limiting the generalisation of the results to a developing country setting.  
However, given the national and international sensitivity surrounding water and water 
services, the study limitations do identify areas for further research. 
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Figure 1 A Structural Map of the Decision Relationship 
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Figure 2 An Overview of the Empirical Model 
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 Table 1 Panel A - Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Study Model 
Continuous Independent Variables 
 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Political visibility (POPCON) 94 .000000 .078484 .00275763 .00975677 
Asset Age: 
Maintenance (OMAPPS) 
 
95 
 
119 
 
2643 
 
532.72 
 
340.685 
Capex (CAPEXR) 98 .00 6.17 1.4470 .99490 
Capacity to Pay: 
Arrears (ARREAREV) 
 
98 
 
.568 
 
38.351 
 
7.22743 
 
6.270178 
 
Variable definitions: POPCON is the ratio of population density to the number of service connections for each case; OMAPPS is the 
operations and maintenance costs per property serviced for each case; CAPEXR is the ratio of capital expenditure to net assets for each case; 
ARREAREV is payment arrears expressed as a percentage of total service provision revenue for each case. 
 
Table 1 Panel B - Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Study Model  
Categorical Independent Variables 
 
      
Categorical Variables  
 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
  
 
Growth: 
(ANGRO) 
Valid        -1 
    0 
    1 
Total 
Missing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
5 
52 
106 
1 
 
 
 
45.8 
4.7 
48.6 
99.1 
100.0 
 
  
Distance: 
(TYRDST) 
Valid        0 
   1 
   2 
Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
53 
44 
107 
 
 
9.3 
49.5 
41.1 
100.0 
 
  
Marginality: 
(ELECTM) 
Valid        0 
   1 
   2 
   3 
Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
10 
29 
21 
107 
 
 
 
43.9 
9.3 
27.1 
19.6 
100.0 
  
 
ANGRO is a measure of the direction of growth for each case using a categorical variable where -1 represents negative growth; 0 represents 
no, or static growth; and, 1 represents positive growth.  TYRDST is a categorical variable classifying entity groupings by distance from the 
State capital Brisbane where: 0 represents no distance influence; 1 some distance influence; and, 2 entities most influenced by the tyranny of 
distance.  ELECTM is the variable for electoral marginality in respect State electorate influence over an entity where: 0 identifies very safe 
electoral influence; 1 identifies safe electoral influence; 2 identifies marginal electoral influence; and, 3 identifies very marginal electoral 
influence. 
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Table 2 Pricing Policy Choice Determinants for the Qld Urban Water Industry – 
Full Model 
 
  Yppc = A + β1POPCON +β2TYRDST + β3ELECTM + β4OAMPPS + β5CAPEXR +β6ARREAREV + β7ANGRO + ε
  
 
Variable Dir  
(+/-) 
Result (1) Result (2) Result (3) Result (4) 
  Coef.f Walda Coeff. Wald Coeff. Wald Coeff. Wald 
Intercept  .961 
(.381) 
.766 .541 
(.571) 
.322 1.189 
(.162) 
1.956 1.146 
(.156) 
2.011 
Political visibility (POPCON) - -129.107 
(.162) 
1.955 -124.227 
(.171) 
1.874 -111.903 
(.173) 
1.857 -112.930 
(.174) 
1.851 
Current asset age (OAMPPS) - -.002 
(.061) 
3.497 -.002 
(.052) 
3.773 -.003* 
(.025) 
5.030 -.003* 
(.025) 
5.040 
Current asset investment 
(CAPEXR) 
+ .372 
(.222) 
1.490 .359 
(.235) 
1.408 .313 
(.267) 
1.233 .308 
(.270) 
1.219 
Capacity to pay (ARREAREV) - -.006 
(.876) 
.024   -.007 
(.869) 
.027   
Growth trend (ANGRO) +  5.227  5.055  5.169  5.181 
Negative growth (ANGRO (1)) - -1.178* 
(.025) 
5.001 -1.122* 
(.028) 
4.828 -1.123* 
(.026) 
4.944 -1.123* 
(.026) 
4.937 
Positive growth (ANGRO (2)) + .364 
(.804) 
.062 .273 
(.849) 
.036 .241 
(.863) 
.030 .269 
(.846) 
.038 
Tyranny of distance (TYRDST) +  1.135  1.490     
Region 1              ( TYRDST(1)) - .526 
(.582) 
.303 .572 
(.542) 
.372     
Region 2              ( TYRDST(2)) - .599 
(.297) 
1.089 .651 
(.230) 
1.441     
Electoral  marginality 
(ELECTM) 
+  .779       
Safe                     (ELECTM(1)) - -.513 
(.462) 
.540       
Marginal             (ELECTM(2)) - -.220 
(.803) 
.062       
Very marginal     (ELECTM(3)) -         
          
Nagelkerke R2 29.2% 28.2% 26.4% 26.4% 
Log likelihood 98.501 99.294 100.778 102.025 
Model Chi-squared (sig) 21.784 (.026)* 20.991 (.004)** 19.507 (.003)** 19.479 (.002)** 
No Change % Classified Correct 89.1% 83.6% 85.5% 85.5% 
Adopt user pays % Classified Correct 68.6% 65.7% 57.1% 60.0% 
Overall % Classified Correctly 81.1% 76.7% 74.4% 75.6% 
For ease of presentation, the categorical variables growth trend (ANGRO), tyranny of distance (TYRDST), and electoral marginality 
(ELECTM) have been grouped together in the table rows immediately preceding the overall model results.  Variable definitions: The 
dependent variable Yppc  is coded 1 when user pays is adopted and 0 when the existing pricing policy is retained; POPCON is the ratio of 
population density to the number of service connections for each case; OAMPPS is the operations and maintenance costs per property 
serviced for each case; CAPEXR is the ratio of capital expenditure to net assets for each case; ARREAREV is payment arrears expressed as a 
percentage of total service provision revenue for each case; and ANGRO is a measure of the direction of growth for each case using a 
categorical variable where ANGRO(1) represents negative growth, ANGRO(2) represents no growth, and because the logistic regression tests 
the change.  ANGRO is a significant variable and therefore has not been omitted from the model during the parsimony tests.  TYRDST 
representing 0 distance influence; TYRDST(1) some distance influence; and, TYRDST(2) entities most influenced by the tyranny of distance.  
ELECTM is the variable for electoral marginality in respect State electorate influence over an entity where, ELECTM identifies very safe 
electoral influence; ELECTM(1) identifies safe electoral influence; ELECTM(2) identifies marginal electoral influence; and ELECTM(3) 
identifies very marginal electoral influence.  Dir. (+/-) refers to the hypothesised direction of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variable, p-values are in brackets.  The Wald statistic has a chi-squared distribution and tests the null that a coefficient is zero.  
Note: ***. Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed), **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), and , *.   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
Further, the categorical independent variables have been grouped separately for results presentation purposes only. 
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